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SUMMARY
This paper is an attempt to estimate and
evaluate the migration potential from Hun-
gary to Austria after EU accession. The
analysis is based primarily on current ten-
dencies and also takes account of the main
findings of several earlier estimates of mi-
gration potential. The paper also focuses on
the expected composition of the potential
migration.
Most previous studies of migration
potential have failed to divulge detailed in-
formation on the labour markets of the
source and receiving countries. Here, with
Hungary as a source country and Austria as
a receiver, the author has been able to focus
on these issues. She set up a simulation
model based on internal mobility within
Hungary. Although in general, there are
problems with extrapolating from internal
mobility to international migration, the re-
sults do not seem to contradict other esti-
mates and could serve as a lower estimated
limit for cross-border population move-
ment. Furthermore, internal mobility within
Hungary has some implications for migra-
tion to Austria, especially in relation to its
potential scale. The results of the simulation
model show that some ten years after free
movement of labour has been applied, the
annual inflow from seven countries exam-
ined would be about 87,000. The order of
magnitude seems compatible with most re-
cent estimates, which predict a movement
of 85,000 people within ten years, from
eight CEE countries. (Romania and Bulgaria
are excluded, but the Baltic states in-
cluded.). The results for Hungary seem to be
low (a total annual outflow to the EU of
7000), but they do not contradict previous
estimates predicting annual outflows to
Austria of 4000.
Recent Austrian plans and likely
spontaneous developments both point to-
wards an improvement in the skill levels of
potential migrants. The government intends
to reinforce and extend the current system
of bilateral agreements on cross-border
commuters (‘Grenzgänger’) and other
commuters (‘Pendler’), to cover Slovakia,
for instance. These will be temporary ar-
rangements until free movements of labour
apply. Work contracts under these agree-
ments have been available primarily to
highly skilled workers. The aim of these
agreements is to facilitate further regional
integration. (Some projects with this aim
are already in progress.) It is planned that
employment regulated by the bilateral trea-
ties will be removed from the national quota
system.
Spontaneous developments could also
lead to higher skill levels among potential
migrants, for both supply-side and demand-
side reasons. As regulations are gradually
liberalized, there is less and less ‘incentive’
to work illegally. Furthermore, closer co-
operation between the two countries after
Hungary’s accession to the EU can make the
control mechanism more efficient (for ex-
ample, discouraging tax evasion). Moreo-
ver, some efforts have been made by Hun-
garian workers to lobby for better, more
equal working conditions, through organi-
sations and trade unions. Wage develop-
ments in Hungary and the albeit slow proc-
ess of catching up may also contribute to
making would-be commuters more selective
in the jobs they take in Austria. On the de-
mand side, the paper shows that even in
once relatively underdeveloped Burgenland,
the highest number of vacancies are found
in jobs requiring some sort of qualification.
Demand for highly skilled labour may in-
crease in the coming years and decades, due
also to demographic developments. The im-
provement in the skill levels of potential mi-
grants will alleviate fears of harmful distri-
bution effects of increased migration. The
most vulnerable groups – unskilled workers
– are not likely to be crowded out of the la-
bour market by a rising inflow of Eastern
European labour.

5INTRODUCTION∗
Most politicians and migration experts
agree about the order of magnitude of the
potential migration from the Central and
East European (CEE) countries to be ex-
pected after their accession to the European
Union. A major study for the European
Commission (Boeri and Brücker 2000) con-
cluded that potential migration would not
be on a scale to bring general commotion
on labour markets of current members, but
Austria and Germany, especially regions
close to borders with entrant countries,
could be affected more than others. Further
focused research is needed to arrive at an
estimate of the migration and likely scenario
for labour-market integration between
Austria/Germany and neighbouring CEE
countries, all the more because research on
migration potential up to now has lacked
detailed information on the labour markets
concerned.
This paper is an initial attempt to fill
the gap in Hungary’s case (i) by estimating
the migration potential and (ii) by project-
ing future impacts from current develop-
ments. For the first, I have prepared a
simulation model that takes account of the
low internal mobility – an important aspect
of the Hungarian labour market. With the
second, the paper focuses on current and
prospective integration of the Austrian and
Hungarian labour markets. Although the
second seems quite a broad issue, closely
related also to trade relations and capital
flows, it is essential because recent Austrian
research has confirmed that migration to
Austria has mainly been driven by demand.
(See, for example, Demel and Bender
1999.) It is cogent to know whether this
will apply after accession as well.
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The paper concentrates mainly on
potential movement of labour, but the re-
lated topics just mentioned should not be
ignored, for they too could have an impor-
tant impact on migration. For example, both
theory and practice suggest that trade de-
velopments and capital inflows can affect
wage developments to a considerable extent
and thereby influence migration decisions.
Furthermore, labour-market integration is
shaped by trade and capital flows as well.
Once this has been realized, it becomes easy
to understand that the process has been
taking place for some time, especially in the
specific case of Hungary and Austria, where
economic relations between them had
started to intensify even before the Ostöff-
nung and the transition period. This was
due partly to measures taken by the Hun-
garian government in the late 1980s to lib-
eralize foreign direct investment regulations
and attract capital, and to earlier efforts to
reform the socialist system in Hungary. The
starting point for this paper is therefore that
labour-market integration between the two
countries has been an ongoing, long-term
process, which is not expected to undergo
further major changes with the single act of
EU accession. Recent decisions to introduce
a seven-year transition period in the free
movement of labour for citizens of candi-
date countries make this hypothesis even
more probable, for it means that the current
situation in this respect will remain un-
changed. (The Europe Agreements of the
1990s left regulations on labour migration
from the CEE within the competence of in-
dividual EU members.)
The paper first gives a brief and criti-
cal overall view of the published estimates
for potential migrants made so far. It then
presents the main results of the simulation
model and interprets them in the light of the
previous estimates. The second section
analyses the current available data on mi-
gration from Hungary to Austria, including
the number and structure of the commut-
ers, based on official Austrian and Hungar-
ian data and recent Hungarian empirical
surveys. The third section touches on possi-
ble economic developments in Hungary that
6could affect migration and commuting (e.g.
wage developments within the context of
the transition period so far and possible
changes in labour mobility due to regional
development). Migration to Austria has
been driven hitherto by demand. This is not
expected to change much, and in terms of
the future inflow of Hungarian labour into
Austria, this is an important issue. The same
section therefore looks at some current data
on labour demand in Austria. The final sec-
tion evaluates the findings and tries to fore-
casts possible consequences of future mi-
gration patterns.
1) PREVIOUS ESTIMATES OF NUMBERS
OF POTENTIAL MIGRANTS
There is keen political and research interest
in potential migration from CEE to current
EU member-states. This reflects strong fears
of massive migration from candidate coun-
tries into neighbouring EU member-states
once membership and free movement of
labour apply to them. Several studies have
therefore been made in the last couple of
years to estimate the potential migration,
but these present numerous problems of
methodology, evaluation and comparability.
According to Peter Huber, a well-known
Austrian expert, there have been no less
than 24 such estimates so far, with results
for the ten candidate countries varying
considerably from 41,000 to 680,000 mi-
grants a year. This spread over an order of
magnitude, he adds, is due to various differ-
ent methods being applied and to the vari-
ous scenarios on which the forecasts were
based.
Even in cases where the results have
been similar, they are often difficult to
evaluate and compare, as they have been
obtained by different methods. Each of the
two commonest approaches has its limita-
tions and advantages and disadvantages. For
example, the empirical findings of a survey
about plans to migrate, taken at a certain
time, may be strongly influenced by current
political and economic events at home and
so scarcely reflect migration potential in the
future. (The fact that a survey shows only a
snapshot is emphasized also by Landesmann
1999, p. 2.) Econometric analysis based on
macro data has no such disadvantage, but
incomplete data can prevent this kind of
research from giving a clear picture of the
composition of potential migration, which is
important especially a political point of
view.1 Estimates of this kind also have their
own limitations because although their
starting point, income differentials, is
among the most important rationales be-
hind migration decisions, other factors
could also play a significant role. Unsur-
prisingly, estimates based only on income
differentials seem to confirm fears of mas-
sive migration. According to one well-
known example, Franzmeyer and Brücker
(1997), the number of potential CEE mi-
grants could lie between 340,000 and
680,000 persons.
So far there have been relatively few
empirical surveys carried out in candidate
countries to establish people’s migration
intentions. One, taken in 1996 in Hungary,
Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia,
put the number of ‘actual’ migrants who
had taken some direct steps (e.g., submitted
an official request for a work permit) at
about 700,000 (Fassmann and Hintermann
1997). The figure in Hungary alone was
about 60,000, which seems realistic, as an-
other poll, the Hungarian Household Panel
Survey (HPP), found a similar number
(57,000–101,000) seriously intending to
migrate. (They responded in the affirmative
in consecutive surveys in 1993 and 1994.
See Sik 1998.)
Apart from its big advantage of re-
cording responses at more than one point in
time, the HHP also provides useful informa-
tion on the composition of the potential mi-
grants. The main results here match inter-
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7national experience: they are mostly young,
highly qualified males (Sik 1998). The HHP
revealed hardly any change in migration
potential during the 1990s, with a consis-
tent 6 per cent expressing such intentions in
1993, 1994 and 1997. (Some 3–4 per cent
of respondents envisaged short-term work
abroad and 1–2 per cent wanted to emi-
grate.)
Although surveys taken at several
points in time are undoubtedly more reli-
able than those taken at only one point,
Landesmann’s criticism seems to apply to
the HHP as well, since it covers a relatively
short period when economic growth was
still sluggish. (Stronger expansion of 4–5
per cent annual GDP growth began in
1997, although it still did not translate into
improved living standards.)
The other estimates also have numer-
ous problems. One difficulty with empirical
surveys lies in statistical errors deriving
from sampling. In the 1996 survey men-
tioned earlier, which was carried out by the
Institute for City and Regional Research of
the Austrian Academy of Sciences, August
Gächter (2000) points to the confidence
interval and contradictions between the es-
timated results and reality. Although it re-
vealed some interesting findings about the
composition of the potential migrants, some
of the groups were so small that it was hard
to reach meaningful, statistically significant
conclusions from them. Another problem
with empirical surveys in general is often
that the questions are too general. They only
inquire into the respondents’ intentions of
staying abroad, but do not go into detail
about their specific plans on arrival. It then
becomes hard to draw any conclusions
about the expected labour migration. The
problem over the total migration potential
also applies to the HHP.
With these caveats in mind, it is still
worth drawing some conclusions about the
potential numbers of migrants to Austria
from some CEE countries, including Hun-
gary. However, it is worth also taking into
account the simulation model I have pre-
pared. This and the results from it are the
subject of the next section.
2) SIMULATION MODEL BASED ON
HUNGARY’S INTERNAL MOBILITY,
COMPARED WITH OTHER ESTIMATES
In an attempt to consider other factors than
income differentials, the model also consid-
ers internal mobility within Hungary.2 The
results refer to migration potential from
eight countries (Hungary, Poland, Slovenia,
Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, Ro-
mania and Bulgaria).
As a starting point, I took the migra-
tion parameter first applied for CEE migra-
tion potential by Franzmeyer and Brücker
(1997) and later adopted by others. (0.008
for 10 per cent in GDP differential). To
make the comparison with the model on
Hungary’s internal mobility, I tried first to
estimate the potential purely on income
differentials. The results would reflect, of
course, a high migration flow (Tables 1 and
2). Apart from the calls of comparison, I
found it necessary to make estimates based
on income differentials only also because
the model has some distinguishing features
from those described in the previous section
(and from the initial attempt – see Note 2.)
They are as follows:
(1) In the past few years, the basic item of
data used in almost all models
(GDP/per capita at PPP) has undergone
revision in all candidate countries to
make it compatible with calculations in
the EU. This has changed the values
considerably.
                                                
2 Thomas Straubhaar and I (Straubhaar and Fóti
1999) estimated migration potential with the help of
a similar model. I would like here to express thanks
to him and a colleague of his, Hubertus Hille. Al-
though the starting point for the calculations was the
same migration coefficient that I have applied now, I
have updated and improved my part and therefore
take full responsibility for the model presented here.
8(2) As the first wave of accession countries
approaches, developments can be fore-
cast more clearly and specifications for
the model tuned and improved. One big
advance was settlement of the timetable
(eight CEE countries admitted in 2004
and two more in 2007).
(3) Future developments are of special im-
portance in the model, so that the
added certainties contribute to gaining
a realistic picture. However, the fore-
cast starts only at 2006, four years later
than those in most of the other models.
On the other hand, current signs of re-
cession in the world economy were not
visible earlier.
(4) I included in the simulation only coun-
tries of special importance as sources of
potential migrants to Austria. (I omitted
the Baltic states.) Since Romania and
Bulgaria will be admitted to the Union
in the second wave, a couple of years
later, the forecast in their case starts in
2010, by which time I assume that they
too will be covered by free labour-
movement provisions.
(5) The economies of the CEE countries
have been growing at different speeds
and I have differentiated between them
according to their prospective growth
rates.
For growth rates, I set up optimistic
and pessimistic scenarios.3 In the optimistic
scenario, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia
seemed to be the fastest growers and I esti-
mated their growth rate at a constant 4 per
cent over the whole period. (Much higher
estimates advanced by high-ranking gov-
ernment officials in Hungary I dismissed as
unrealistic, especially over the longer term.)
I assumed that growth in the other candi-
date countries could also be influenced by
the accession, and so for the Czech Republic
                                                
3 In the optimistic scenario, I tried to be more cau-
tious this time, in view of current developments in
the world economy. Instead of forecasting real an-
nual GDP growth of 6 per cent for all the CEE coun-
tries examined, my improved and updated model
differentiated among countries and over time. (See
Tables 11–17 in the Appendix.)
and Slovakia I calculated initially with 3 per
cent growth, and later, when the 2004 ac-
cession date became clear, I raised it to 4
per cent. In Romania, my initial estimate
was 2 per cent, gradually improving after
2004 to 3 per cent. However, it was as-
sumed that the rate would catch up those of
other countries in the region only after ac-
cession, which I assumed would take place
in 2010. Bulgaria is expected to enter the
EU at the same time, but its growth rate was
estimated at 3 per cent from an earlier date.
Meanwhile the growth rate in the EU was
put at 2 per cent for the whole period. In
the pessimistic scenario, growth was put at
a constant 2 per cent for the candidate
countries and the existing EU. (For the data
applied, see Tables 11–17 in the Appendix.)
In the other two estimates, labelled
‘low migration flow’, the low internal mo-
bility in Hungary was also considered. I cal-
culated across the whole region with the
Hungarian rate of mobility, on the assump-
tion that this would not differ to any con-
siderable extent. (The assumption is sup-
ported by the many common factors, such
as poor infrastructure, high transport costs,
scarcity of rented housing, etc.) As a result,
the original 0.008 migration parameter de-
clined to 0.0015. Otherwise, the same data
were applied (GDP/capita in PPP, real
growth rate, differences in GDP/capita val-
ues relative to the EU average, populations,
and population growth rate).
The results differ greatly, due to the
considerable difference in the two migra-
tion parameters applied (annual averages
for 2006–18 estimated from 37,000 or
28,000 to 7,000 or 5,000). However, I
think it is realistic to assume that the mi-
gration potential will lie between the two
indicative extremes. The upper limit seems
unrealistic even compared with earlier re-
search, although results for the early period
are not far from these. According to Brücker
and Boeri (2000), potential annual flow
from the CEE 8 (excluding Bulgaria and
Romania, but including the Baltic states)
could be put at an initial 200,000, declining
to 85,000 by the end of the first ten-year
period. Sinn et al. estimated the initial
9Table 1
Migration potential from CEE countries to the EU in 2006–18, based on income differentials (high
migration flow) and with a catching-up process
Year Romania Bulgaria Poland Hungary Slovakia CzechRepublic Slovenia Σ
Σ PL, H,
SK, CZ,
SLO
2006 … … 171889 34260 21770 31978 3476 263373 263373
2007 … … 168758 33160 21279 30847 3216 257258 257258
2008 … … 165599 32059 20783 29710 2954 251104 251104
2009 … … 162412 30959 20283 28567 2690 244910 244910
2010 128490 46566 159195 29872 19779 27418 2423 413743 238687
Σ 2006-2010 128490 46566 827852 160309 103893 148519 14759 1430388 1255332
∅ ... … 165570 32062 20779 29704 2952 286078 251066
2011 126558 45785 155947 28783 19270 26263 2155 404761 232417
2012 124636 45010 152668 27691 18757 25100 1883 395745 226098
2013 122724 44242 149354 26596 18238 23930 1609 386694 219728
2014 120821 43481 146006 25497 17715 22752 1332 377604 213302
2015 118926 42725 142622 24395 17186 21565 1052 368471 206820
2016 117040 41976 139200 23288 16651 20369 769 359293 200277
2017 115162 41232 135739 22176 16110 19164 483 350065 193671
2018 113292 40494 132236 21059 15564 17948 192 340785 186999
Σ 2011-1018 959159 344946 1153772 199486 139490 177090 9476 2983418 1679313
∅ 119894.9 43118.25 144221.5 24935.69 17436.19 22136.2 1184.5 372927.2 209914
Σ 2006-2018 1087649 391512 1981624 359794 243383 325609 24235 4413806 2934645
∅ 120850 43501 152433 27676 18722 25047 1864 339524 225742
Source: Own calculations based on the data from the WIIW (population) and Deutsche Bank (GDP).
Table 2
Migration potential from CEE countries to the EU in 2006–18, based on income differentials (high
migration flow) and the same (stagnant) growth in both regions
Year Romania Bulgaria Poland Hungary Slovakia CzechRepublic Slovenia Σ
Σ PL, H,
SK, CZ,
SLO
2006 … … 187150 39120 23405 35694 4848 290217 290217
2007 … … 186623 38827 23328 35498 4822 289096 289096
2008 … … 186096 38536 23251 35302 4795 287981 287981
2009 … … 185572 38247 23174 35108 4769 286871 286871
2010 132049 48381 185049 37980 23098 34915 4743 466215 285785
Σ 2006-2010 132049 48381 930490 192710 116255 176517 23977 1620380 1439950
∅ ... … 186098 38542 23251 35303 4795 324076 287990
2011 130992 47891 184527 37715 23022 34723 4718 463587 284704
2012 129944 47405 184007 37451 22946 34532 4692 460976 283627
2013 128904 46924 183488 37189 22870 34342 4667 458384 282556
2014 127873 46448 182970 36929 22795 34153 4641 455810 281489
2015 126849 45977 182455 36671 22720 33965 4616 453253 280427
2016 125834 45511 181940 36415 22645 33779 4591 450715 279369
2017 124827 45049 181427 36160 22570 33593 4566 448193 278317
2018 123828 44592 180916 35908 22496 33408 4541 445689 277268
Σ 2011-1018 1019053 369798 1461729 294439 182063 272495 37031 3636608 2247757
∅ 127381,6 46224,72 182716,1 36804,87 22757,88 34061,84 4628,933 454575,9 280970
Σ 2006-2018 1151101 418179 2392219 487149 298318 449012 61009 5256987 3687707
∅ 127900 46464 184017 37473 22948 34539 4693 404384 283670
Source as Table 1.
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figure at 240,000, declining to 125,000 by
the end of the first ten years. In my simula-
tion model, the initial 2006 figure is
263,000, with a slower decline to a maxi-
mum of 187,000.
However, the lowest limit also seems
unrealistic, as mobility in Hungary is very
low. A distinction needs making between
international migration and internal mobil-
ity. It would be a mistake to extrapolate
from low internal mobility to low motiva-
tion for international migration.4 Reasons
for the former are very specific to CEE
countries. (Details for Hungary appear later
in the paper.) However, low internal mobil-
ity has direct implications for potential mi-
gration to Austria mainly through com-
muter numbers. These could be worth con-
sidering when calculating the lowest limit
of migration potential.
The potential number of Hungarians
over the whole period examined (between
2006 – the earliest date when free move-
ment of labour could be applied after the
earliest possible accession – and 2018), the
average annual migration flow could be less
than 20,000.5 Of these, the people who
choose Austria would be well below 10,000
(according to the experience, more than
half the Hungarians who go to the EU pre-
fer Germany). The initial total outflow from
the country of around 20,000 could decline
to 10,000 towards the end of the second
decade, meaning a potential migration of
less than 5,000 a year to Austria by that
time. This corresponds to other estimates
(surveys and econometric models). They
‘forecast annual migration flows from Hun-
gary to Austria in the region of 4000 people
over a period of about ten years’ (Cséfalvay,
Matolcsy and Landesmann 1999).
                                                
4 For example, large disparities in human capital
endowments between regions within one country
could contribute to low internal mobility, whereas
this applies less to international migration.
5 In the initial model, where Straubhaar considered
the experiences of migration from the less developed
Mediterranean member countries (Greece, Portugal
and Spain), Hungary’s potential was estimated at
13,000 (Straubhaar and Fóti 1999).
When estimating potential migration
from Hungary to Austria, it is worthwhile
distinguishing clearly between migrants
and commuters, which only a few estimates
have done. The annual increase in the flow
of commuters has been put at about 2500 in
some estimates (scenario with rapid equali-
zation of wage levels) and 4000 in others
(assuming slow nominal wage catch-up),
for a period of 7–8 years (see Cséfalvay et
al. 1999). The gravity model of Peter Huber
(1998) also sought to estimate commuter
numbers. He estimated that about 17,000
Hungarian, Czech and Slovenian commut-
ers would be working in directly neigh-
bouring Austrian regions five years after the
introduction of free movement of labour,
and a further 32,000 in urban areas, espe-
cially Vienna.6
Looking at Austrian Labour Office
(AMS) data at the end of the 1990s (1998), this
estimate seems quite high, as the total num-
bers of all workers from all three countries
(not just commuters) stood at less than 19,000
(6067 from Slovenia, 3982 from the Czech
Republic and 8675 from Hungary). Huber’s
estimate may seem realistic taking into account
the other estimate of a 2500 annual increase
from Hungary, for example. Nor do results of
the Hungarian Household Panel contradict
these findings, as 0.2 per cent of respondents
(about 15,000 people) said in two consecutive
years that they would like to work in Austria
for a short time. (Of course, this does not
mean that all would be commuters, but the
number can be regarded as a proxy in view of
the short period cited.) Interestingly, almost
the same number for cross-border migration
from Hungary to Austria emerged from the
1996 empirical survey in the Visegrád coun-
tries7 (Fassmann and Hintermann 1997), al-
though their estimate of 16,000 is the lower
limit of a very wide range, where the upper
limit is a massive 524,000. For as one study
                                                
6 According to some Austrian experts, the highest
proportion of commuters would come from Slovakia.
They assume that the number of potential Slovak
commuters after EU accession would be about
100,000 (quoted in Walterskirchen 2000).
7 The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.
11
Table 3
Migration potential from CEE countries to the EU in 2006–18, based on internal mobility within Hun-
gary (low migration flow) and with a catching-up process
Year Romania Bulgaria Poland Hungary Slovakia CzechRepublic Slovenia Σ
Σ PL, H,
SK, CZ,
SLO
2006 … … 30993 6168 3921 5801 626 47509 47509
2007 … … 30563 5991 3848 5619 580 46601 46601
2008 … … 30122 5812 3773 5434 534 45675 45675
2009 … … 29669 5634 3697 5245 487 44732 44732
2010 23168 8379 29204 5454 3618 5054 439 75317 43770
Σ 2006-2010 23168 8379 150552 29059 18858 27152 2666 259834 228287
Ø ... … 30110 5812 3772 5430 533 51967 45657
2011 22954 8288 28727 5272 3538 4859 391 74029 42787
2012 22737 8196 28238 5087 3456 4661 342 72718 41784
2013 22518 8104 27735 4900 3373 4459 293 71382 40760
2014 22297 8011 27219 4711 3287 4254 242 70022 39715
2015 22072 7917 26690 4520 3200 4046 192 68637 38648
2016 21845 7823 26148 4326 3110 3834 140 67226 37558
2017 21615 7728 25591 4130 3019 3618 88 65790 36446
2018 21383 7633 25020 3932 2925 3399 35 64326 35311
Σ 2011-1018 177421 63700 215369 36879 25908 33130 1723 554130 313009
Ø 22178 7962 26921 4610 3238 4141 215 69266 39126
Σ 2006-2018 200589 72079 365921 65938 44766 60282 4390 813964 541296
Ø 22288 8009 28148 5072 3444 4637 338 62613 41638
Source as Table 1.
Table 4
Migration potential from CEE countries to the EU based on internal mobility within Hungary (low mi-
gration flow), with same (stagnant) growth in both regions
Year Romania Bulgaria Poland Hungary Slovakia CzechRepublic Slovenia Σ
Σ PL, H,
SK, CZ,
SLO
2006 … … 34951 7335 4371 6726 909 54292 54292
2007 … … 34989 7304 4372 6715 906 54285 54285
2008 … … 35027 7273 4373 6704 903 54279 54279
2009 … … 35066 7242 4373 6693 900 54274 54274
2010 24759 9071 35104 7215 4374 6682 896 88102 54271
Σ 2006-2010 24759 9071 175137 36368 21863 33520 4514 305232 271402
Ø ... … 35027 7274 4373 6704 903 61046 54280
2011 24682 9025 35143 7188 4375 6671 893 87976 54270
2012 24605 8978 35181 7161 4376 6660 890 87851 54268
2013 24528 8932 35220 7134 4377 6649 887 87726 54266
2014 24451 8886 35258 7107 4378 6638 884 87602 54265
2015 24375 8840 35297 7081 4379 6627 881 87479 54264
2016 24298 8795 35336 7054 4379 6616 878 87356 54263
2017 24223 8749 35374 7028 4380 6605 875 87234 54262
2018 24147 8704 35413 7001 4381 6594 872 87112 54261
∑ 2011-1018 195308 70910 282223 56753 35025 53057 7061 700336 434119
Ø 24413 8864 35278 7094 4378 6632 883 87542 54265
∑ 2006-2018 220067 79981 457360 93121 56888 86577 11575 1005568 705520
Ø 24452 8887 35182 7163 4376 6660 890 77351 54271
Source as Table 1.
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of the future of Hungarian-Austrian rela-
tions notes, the lower limit is ‘generally
accepted as being the more realistic’
(Cséfalvay and Matolcsy 1999).
As regards flow data (as opposed to
stock, which was used by Huber) and the
total number of workers from the CEE
countries, the estimate by Franzmeyer and
Brücker (1997) is that 23,000–45,000
people a year could migrate to Austria.
Dietz and Walterskirchen (1998) arrived
at similar results by similar methods, con-
cluding that 30,000–40,000 people would
go there. These estimates are based only on
income differences, but Walterskirchen
assumes in the light of migration experi-
ences from the Southern countries, about
200,000 Eastern Europeans could migrate
to Austria after EU accession, over a period
of ten years.8
Some interesting empirical surveys
were carried out in Hungarian regions
bordering on Austria recently, among
current commuters and among those plan-
ning to go abroad. These also yield some
findings about the potential number of
commuters and/or migrants. First, how-
ever, it is worth looking at the present
situation: the composition of Hungarian
workers employed in Austria today.
3) HUNGARIAN WORKERS IN
AUSTRIA – NUMBERS AND PATTERNS
This section begins by reviewing some
features of Austrian employment of Hun-
garians. Some data on commuters are then
analysed. Finally, the characteristics and
composition of the commuters are exam-
ined on the basis of recent empirical sur-
veys.
                                                
8 Walterskirchen notes elsewhere in his article that
the biggest flow of 123,000 could be expected from
Poland. According to findings by Polish researchers
(Orlowski and Zienkowski, 1999), a range of
23,000–61,000 seems realistic.
3.1. Overview
It is difficult to compare data from the
population census or Fremdeninforma-
tionssystem (FIS, aliens’ register) with those
from the Austrian Labour Office (AMS) as
the coverage is different in part. Nonethe-
less, employment is clearly the dominant
activity among Hungarians resident in
Austria. (According to FIS, there were
15,493 residents with Hungarian citizen-
ship in mid-2000. According to the AMS,
there were 11,071 Hungarians employed
in Austria at that time.) The dominance of
the employed has been increasing for a
couple of decades: 61 per cent of Hungari-
ans in Austria were employed at the begin-
ning of the 1970s and 66.4 per cent in
1991. Although comparable data has not
been available since then, FIS shows that
some 70 per cent of the registered Hun-
garian population in Austria in 1998 were
employed (wage or salary earners). The
increase persisted despite a slight fall in
employment in the second half of the
1990s ‘almost certainly as a consequence
of the restrictive employment policy to-
wards persons of third country origin’
(Intensification 1999). The only explana-
tion for this is that the Hungarian resident
population decreased even more. This is
supported by data from FIS, which show a
slight decline in 1995. Table 5 shows that
the geographical concentration of employ-
ees from Hungary has been increasing.
The geographical structure reflects
certain features. Perhaps the most con-
spicuous is the importance of distance
(which also explains the dominance of
employment). Employment is increasingly
concentrated in the bordering province of
Burgenland, following a shift in the 1990s
from Vienna, although Vienna’s share of
all Hungarian employees has not decreased
as much as Burgenland’s has increased.
This ‘can be taken as a signal for the
emerging economic reintegration of the
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whole region, comparable to the Austro-
Swiss or Austro-German border regions
after the WWII’ (Intensification 1999.)
Support for this assumption comes from
the fact that about half the foreigners em-
ployed in Burgenland are Hungarians.
(Altogether 6900 foreigners were em-
ployed in Burgenland in 1998. As Table 1
shows, 3525 of these were Hungarians.
The respective figures in 1999 were: 7200
and 3712.) However, there could certainly
be additional explanations. Policy meas-
ures such restrictive immigration policies
and bilateral agreements must also have
played a role. An indication of the former
is a fall in the number employed in Vienna
from 2521 in 1993 to 1711 at the end of
the decade.9 Bilateral agreements for an
exchange of trainees and border commut-
ers, which were concluded in 1997 and
came into force in 1998, are reflected in
                                                
9 However, Vienna’s share of resident Hungarians is
still higher than its share of Hungarian employees.
The gap is smaller in Burgenland’s case. The re-
spective figures in July 2000 were 25.8 per cent
and 30.7 per cent. (Source: FIS, see Biffl 2001.)
the increase of employ-
ment in Burgenland in
1998 and 1999.
It is worth looking
at the composition of the
Hungarian employees by
demographic character-
istics such as age and
gender (Table 6). The
gender differences are
smallest in the youngest
age groups and greatest
in the prime age group
(30–39). These features
are understandable, but
the proportion of women
is generally very low, and
in the younger age
groups, it declined during
the 1990s. This may re-
flect a change in occupa-
tional structure. (Further
details on the age and
gender patterns appear
later.)
Table 6
Structure of the population of Hungarians
working in Austria by age group and gender,
%
Age groups
15–18 19–24 25–29 30–39 40–49 50–54
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1992 1 1 8 7 12 5 32 6 19 4 2 0
1993 1 1 7 7 12 6 31 6 20 4 3 1
1994 1 1 6 6 12 6 30 6 23 5 3 1
1995 1 0 5 5 11 6 29 6 25 5 4 1
1996 1 0 4 4 11 6 28 6 28 5 5 1
1997 1 0 3 3 10 5 27 6 30 5 6 1
1998 0 0 3 2 8 5 27 6 31 5 7 1
1999 0 0 4 2 8 3 26 6 31 5 7 1
Note: Older age groups take inconsiderable shares.
Percentages may not add up to 100 due to round-
ing.
Source: Austrian Labour Office (AMS)
The educational attainment struc-
ture, on the other hand, seems surprising
Table 5
Hungarian employees* in Austria by provinces,
annual averages, 1992–9
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Persons 2143 2936 3223 3322 3335 3365 3525 3712Burgenland % 28 29 33 34 36 34 41 41
Persons 123 133 131 128 120 114 111 108Carinthia % 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Persons 1592 2124 2091 2019 1850 1793 1740 1784Lower Austria % 21 21 21 21 20 20 20 20
Persons 744 858 795 748 683 640 614 600Upper Austria % 10 9 8 8 7 7 7 7
Persons 191 266 226 197 188 176 164 186Salzburg % 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2
Persons 567 635 614 599 579 544 506 523Styria % 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Persons 192 285 254 233 231 198 178 216Tyrol % 2 3 3 2 3 2 2 2
Persons 162 221 201 191 175 151 139 129Vorarlberg % 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
Persons 2043 2521 2338 2194 2003 1882 1697 1711Vienna % 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19
Persons 7756 9978 9875 9631 9164 8864 8675 8968Total** % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
* Employees of Hungarian citizenship with a work permit (‘Bewilli-
gungspflichtig Beschäftigte’).
** There may be differences in total sums due to rounding.
Source: Austrian Labour Office (AMS).
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at first sight, especially in the light of gen-
eral impressions of skill patterns among
CEE migrants. Migration research carried
out in Austria in the 1990s has shown that
the qualification levels of migrants are
considerably higher than those of ‘tradi-
tional’ migrant workers from Turkey or
former Yugoslavia (Demel and Bender
1999).10 High skill levels among Hungari-
ans, Czechs and Slovenians were also re-
vealed in an empirical study of an explor-
ative nature (and far from representa-
tive).11 Not all of this information is cor-
roborated by the AMS data, although it
turned out that the latter are not gathered
                                                
10 The authors refer, among other work, to 1997
research by Biffl, Deutsch, Lutz, Marterbauer, and
Hofinger et al., and 1995 research by Faßmann,
Kohlbacher and Reeger. However, they add that
there has been little detailed study of skill levels and
data is lacking in many cases.
11 A mere 165 Hungarian, Czech and Slovenian
migrants were selected by snowball sampling, with
the associated risk of serious distortions.
on a regular basis. Educational attainment
becomes relevant mainly if workers be-
come unemployed.12 The AMS data will
therefore contain serious distortions be-
cause high-skilled employees are heavily
underrepresented.
The proportion of CEE migrants in
Austria with a secondary-school leaving
certificate is thought to be about 10 per
cent.13 This could only be confirmed by
data from the 2001 census, which are not
yet available. If data by occupations or
economic sectors are examined, however,
a higher incidence seems much more real-
istic (Table 4).
Although the categories may seem to
be confusing, since economic sectors and
occupations are mingled, the data in Table
4 may be revealing. If only the categories
                                                
12 Information provided by the AMS. I am grateful
for the help of Katharina Demel.
13 I am grateful for this information to Gudrun Biffl.
Table 7
Hungarian employees in Austria by economic sectors and occupations in the 1990s annual averages,
Austrian categories, 1992–9
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1992 161 1151 1935 359 166 305 237 235 401 1156 146 334 345 208 240 7756
% 2 15 25 5 2 4 3 3 5 15 2 4 4 3 3
1993 265 1396 2378 448 212 406 312 305 536 1597 185 420 454 292 316 9978
% 3 14 24 4 2 4 3 3 5 16 2 4 5 3 3
1994 297 1443 2308 450 196 420 316 304 569 1569 180 399 410 281 286 9875
% 3 15 23 5 2 4 3 3 6 16 2 4 4 3 3
1995 350 1417 2247 445 178 425 301 264 631 1533 151 370 373 271 254 9631
% 4 15 23 5 2 4 3 3 7 16 2 4 4 3 3
1996 441 1346 2174 412 162 423 253 240 611 1426 129 338 328 253 236 9164
% 5 15 24 4 2 5 3 3 7 16 1 4 4 3 3
1997 580 1281 2116 395 140 418 227 225 577 1290 122 332 319 241 235 8864
% 7 14 24 4 2 5 3 3 7 15 1 4 4 3 3
1998 666 1269 2041 386 130 408 222 206 564 1279 113 325 296 212 221 8675
% 8 15 24 4 1 5 3 2 7 15 1 4 3 2 3
1999 771 1252 2065 376 133 452 261 194 594 1417 111 325 286 196 205 8968
% 9 14 23 4 1 5 3 2 7 16 1 4 3 2 2
Source: Austrian Labour Office (AMS)
Note: Sectors and occupations are indicated only where numbers are high enough to be expressed in percent-
ages. The total is not therefore the sum of the numbers given.
15
are considered where there is clear refer-
ence to occupation (clerks, technicians,
health employees, educational and cultural
occupations), the assumption of a 10 per
cent share for secondary schooling seems
realistic14. In principle, it is also possible to
draw some conclusions on skill levels from
employment patterns purely by economic
sectors. But looking at the 1998 data, for
example, the figures on Hungarian, Slove-
nian and Czech employees do not suggest
much difference from the pattern for all
foreign workers in Austria.15 It has to be
noted, however, that educational attain-
ment could give a clearer picture of skill
level than occupational categories do. Ex-
perience suggests that employment in low-
lier jobs than skills warrant is quite wide-
spread among foreign labour in Austria.
The explorative study mentioned earlier
found that such cases made up a third of
the respondents (Demel and Bender 1999).
3.2. Employment under bilateral
agreements: trainees and com-
muters
There are two bilateral agreements regu-
lating special kinds of employment of
Hungarians in Austria. Both concluded in
1997, they allow quotas to be set each year
for trainees and for commuters. In the first
year, 1998, the number of trainees was set
at 300 and that of commuters at 550. The
quotas gradually increased in subsequent
years: 300 and 650 in 1999, 400 and 900
                                                
14 However, market traders, showmen and musi-
cians are listed among educational and cultural
occupations and their numbers could be high, so
that the relatively high share of this category could
be misleading. In economic sectors such as tourism,
however, occupations requiring a secondary
schooling could be concealed in some cases.
15 In four sectors usually considered less skill-
intensive (manufacturing, construction, hotels and
restaurants, and trade/maintenance), the share of
employment exceeds 60 per cent in both cases (for
all foreign workers, and for Czechs, Slovenians and
Hungarians).
in 2000, and 600 and 1200 in 2001
(Source: Ministry of Family and Social Af-
fairs, Budapest; Labour Office of Vas
County, and Free Movement 2001.)
With trainees, employment may last
from six months to a year, with a possible
extension up to a maximum of 18 months,
depending on the current labour-market
situation. Trainees should be between 18
and 35 years of age, speak German, have
the qualifications for the job, and also have
work experience of at least 2–3 years in a
corresponding job. In principle, the AMS
helps to place applicants, but experience
suggests that most applications are ap-
proved after the applicant has concluded a
contract with an Austrian employer. By the
third year, the scheme was proving popu-
lar, with many more people working under
it in 2000 than in the previous year. In
1999, many trainees were being employed
in cities: 20.8 per cent went to Vienna,
12.7 per cent to Graz and 12.1 per cent to
Salzburg. A year later, the destinations
were more diversified, with fewer going to
cities (14.9 per cent to Vienna, 14.4 to Sal-
zburg and 9.3 per cent to Graz) and more
to smaller places close to the Hungarian
border or to resorts (e.g. Wiener Neustadt,
Feldbach, Feldkirchen and Knittenfeld).16
The composition shows the usual picture of
male domination and most people well
below the age limit of 35.
Table 8
Gender composition of Hungarian trainees in
Austria, 1999 and 2000
Male Female Total Male Female Total
Year
Persons Percentages
1999 143 31 174 82.2 17.8 100.0
Extension 8 1 9 88.9 11.1 100.0
2000 312 46 358 87.2 12.8 100.0
Extension 1 2 3 33.3 66.7 100.0
Source: Hungarian Labour Office (OMKMK), Bu-
dapest. See Fóti and Németh 2001.
                                                
16 See Fóti and Németh 2001.
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Border areas where Hungarians may
work are listed in the agreement on cross-
border commuters.17 The duration can be a
maximum of six months, but it is renew-
able at six-month intervals. Although it
includes no age criteria, most cross-border
commuters are below the age 30. It can be
assumed that their skill levels are lower
than those of the trainees,
as the agreement makes
no qualification or lan-
guage-knowledge stipu-
lations. For the last two
years, however, the
agreement has capped the
numbers who can work
in one neighbouring dis-
trict of Lower Austria –
Bruck an der Leitha –
while limiting the num-
bers employable in agri-
culture, tourism (Gast-
gewerbe) and other sec-
tors in Burgenland.18
                                                
17 The Austrian act on aliens of 1997 narrowed the
definition of Grenzgänger and distinguished them
from grenzüberschreitende Pendler. The former
covers those who commute daily to work and
therefore need a work permit but no residence
permit. The latter work beyond the border districts
and need both. The terminology is confusing, as
Pendler means commuter, but not necessarily one
who commutes daily. In the Hungarian terminol-
ogy, the Grenzgänger are called as ‘cross-border
commuters’, which I adopt in this paper. The num-
ber of Pendler is much smaller all over Austria – the
total being only 400 in July 1999 and 600 in July
2000, of which 140 were Hungarians (Biffl 2001).
The districts covered are Bruck an der Leitha, Neu-
siedl am See, Eisenstadt, (including Rust), Matters-
burg, Güssing, Oberpullendorf and Oberwart.
18 A share of 11–12 per cent may work in Bruck an
der Leitha, while in Burgenland, 24-8 per cent may
Although
the numbers
set under the
agreement on
cross-border
commuters
were increased
gradually over
the last few
years, even the
last figure (up
to 1200 persons) is less than the actual
number involved in the mid-1990s. For
example, as many as 2000 were employed
in 1994, according to the figures of the
Austrian Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs.19 The situation remains similar to-
day, and there could conceivably be quite a
number of cross-border commuters not
working under the agreement. The rela-
tively long traditions of Hungarian cross-
border commuting into Austria and per-
haps the agreement itself suggest that
Hungarians are by far the largest contin-
gent of such employees. Table 7 shows that
altogether 2826 Hungarians were working
in Austria as cross-border commuters in
July 2000, including 101 in Lower Austria
(obviously Bruck an der Leitha). Of the
2725 commuters in Burgenland, it can be
assumed that the majority were not em-
                                                                        
work in agriculture, 22–4 per cent in tourism and
35–43 per cent in other sectors.
19 See Intensification 1999.
Table 9
Age composition of Hungarian trainees in Austria, 1999 and 2000
<25 26–30 31–35 36–40 Total <25 26–30 31–35 36–40 Total
Year
Numbers Percentages
1999 69 61 43 1 174 39.7 35.1 24.7 0.5 100.0
Extension 6 2 1 - 9 66.7 22.2 11.1 - 100.0
2000 158 127 72 - 357 44.3 35.6 20.1 - 100.0
Extension 1 2 - - 3 33.3 66.7 - - 100.0
Source as Table 8.
Table 10
The structure of cross-border commuting by citizenship and target province,
July 2000
Citizenship LowerAustria Burgenland Styria Carinthia
Upper
Austria Total
Bosnian 1 1
Croatian 1 1
Poles 3 3
Slovak 623 156 1 780
Slovene 1 56 539 57 653
Czech 786 1 133 920
Turkish 1 1
Hungarian 101 2725 2826
Other 959 6 966
Total 1515 3898 541 57 140 6149
Source: Austrian Ministry of Interior (see G. Biffl, 2001).
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ployed under the agreement.20 (However,
in 1999, when the limit was only 600,
there were actually 1227 valid permits,
including the high number of the exten-
sions, some continuing from the previous
year.) All the workers in Bruck an der
Leitha, on the other hand, may have been
covered by the agreement, as the limit in
2000 stood at 110.
Noticeably fewer cross-border com-
muters come from Slovakia or the Czech
Republic than from Hungary. (A similar
agreement with the Czech Republic en-
sued.)21
3.3. Recent surveys of Hungarian
commuters and potential mi-
grants – some lessons
As mentioned in the Introduction, a realis-
tic picture of migration potential calls not
only for an estimate of the number of mi-
grants, but also some idea about their pos-
sible composition. So it is necessary to ex-
amine the current pattern in some detail.
Ambiguity arises out of the limited infor-
mation available from official statistics, for
example on skill levels. Recent empirical
surveys can offer some invaluable supple-
mentary information. Here two surveys are
briefly described, one among cross-border
commuters covered by the bilateral agree-
ment,22 and the other conducted in Hun-
garian regions bordering to Austria, cov-
ering those with work experience in Aus-
tria and those planning to apply for a job
there in the future.23
                                                
20 The limit had not been reached in July. (Accord-
ing to the Hungarian Labour Office in Vas county,
832 permits had been given by the end of October
2000, including extensions as well as first-timers
(http://www.vasmmk.hu/internet/ingstat.htm).
21 Free Movement 2001.
22 The account is based on Laky 2001.
23 See Preparity Project 2001.
Many cross-border commuters not
covered by the bilateral agreement work
with seasonal work permits, although some
have found it more advantageous to have a
permit under the agreement even for sea-
sonal work. In this respect, the findings of
the survey among cross-border commuters
under the agreement should be interpreted
with some caution. It was conducted in
spring 2000, when the regional labour of-
fice cooperated in posting questionnaires
to 890 persons, of whom 248 (29 per cent)
replied. The respondents’ age and gender
patterns were similar to those of the recipi-
ent sample. The skill level of the respon-
dents was high: 90 per cent had some sort
of qualification. More than half were
skilled workers and about a third had sec-
ondary-school attainment. As the author of
the report on the survey rightly remarked,
the successful applicants for permits are
likely to have been the ones with some
kind of qualification. As regards the skilled
workers, many were carpenters, traders,
bricklayers, house painters, fitters, cooks,
waiters and electricians. More than two
thirds of the respondents already had a job
or were self-employed in Hungary before
applying. Very few had been unemployed.
Of the respondents, 59 per cent were sat-
isfied with their wages and 41 per cent
gave no other advantage of working in
Austria than high earnings. Others, how-
ever, mentioned skill acquisition, making
new friends, and practising German. The
survey revealed that two thirds of the
commuters had already worked abroad in
the 1990s, most of them in Austria. So for
many of the commuters, working abroad
had become a way of life. This is confirmed
by the responses to the question about
plans after finishing commuting, where 57
per cent answered that they would seek
another job abroad.
The other survey was conducted a
couple of months later in August 2000, by
the Hungarian Gallup Institute, in three
Hungarian counties bordering Austria
(Győr-Moson-Sopron, Vas and Zala). The
sample of 1014 persons represented the
population aged 15–74 in the three coun-
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ties proportionate to their populations.
Work experience abroad was reported by
89 respondents: 63 men and 26 women.
Of these, 9 per cent had an educational
attainment of the eight compulsory pri-
mary-school years, as opposed to 19 per
cent in the population as a whole. With
secondary-school attainment, the propor-
tions were 74 and 64 per cent respectively.
With tertiary education, the proportion in
both cases was 17 per cent. The figures
showed that those who had already
worked abroad and those only planning to
do so (who numbered 122 of the sample)
were also more mobile within Hungary
than the rest of the population. The survey
confirmed the conclusion of the previous
one: it was not the most vulnerable groups
who had migration plans, but those whose
living standards were stable and satisfac-
tory. Many of the young males with aspi-
rations to migrate were not satisfied with
their current jobs, which in their case
could be regarded as a push factor. Half of
those with work experience abroad had
found a job corresponding to their qualifi-
cations, 35 per cent were doing jobs that
differed from their skills, and 15 per cent
went abroad aware that their job would
not match their qualifications. Of the 53
persons who had worked in Austria, most
(39) mentioned that they had tried to find
a job there through friends. Of those with
migration plans, 61 per cent wanted to
work in Austria and 11 per cent were
ready to go there even if their working
conditions would be worse than at home.
The majority of the 74 planning to work in
Austria had taken some steps towards
reaching their objective. Most mentioned
that they would rely on information and
help from friends and acquaintances.
The authors of the report on the sur-
vey projected the results onto the whole
population of the region between the ages
of 15 and 60. According to their estimates,
almost 57,000 people would have worked
abroad and more than 75,000 had such
intentions. About 5 per cent of the popula-
tion had taken more than one preparatory
step towards finding a job abroad. With
Austria as a destination, 7 per cent planned
to go there (46,116 persons), and 81 per
cent of them had taken at least one step in
the job search.
In sum, the survey suggests that alto-
gether 12 per cent of the region’s popula-
tion aged 15–74 years had migration in-
tentions. This seems realistic in the light of
the earlier Hungarian empirical research
on migration potential (Household Panel
Survey), where the migration potential
stood at 6 per cent. Double that proportion
would be understandable in a region bor-
dering on a more developed country.
4) PROSPECTIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN
HUNGARY (REGIONAL LABOUR
MOBILITY AND WAGE
DEVELOPMENTS) AND AUSTRIA
(LABOUR DEMAND)
This section concerns prospective devel-
opments that could influence directly the
Hungarian labour supply available for mi-
gration, especially to Austria. Two consid-
erations are outlined: regional labour mo-
bility and wage developments. On the de-
mand side, some facts on current labour
demand in Austria are added, on the as-
sumption that present tendencies will per-
sist for some time.
Regional labour mobility in Hungary
is very low. This is reflected, for instance,
in stubbornly high disparities between re-
gional unemployment rates. (Despite im-
proving labour-market performance in the
late 1990s, differences in regional unem-
ployment rates have not changed much.)
As regards reasons for low labour mobility,
many studies have already analysed them
(for example, Fazekas 1996, Kertesi 1999,
Köllő 1997, and Lehmann and Fóti 1998).
So the only issue addressed here is whether
they are likely to persist. The most com-
monly cited reasons for the sluggish mobil-
ity are housing shortage and poor levels of
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infrastructure, including underdeveloped
transport facilities. Internal migration is
impeded, apart from cultural traditions, by
present housing ownership patterns (more
than nine-tenths of the stock is owned pri-
vately by its former tenants), a resulting
lack of a housing market, lack of mortgage
financing, and huge price differences in
the housing market between ‘good’ and
‘bad’ regions. (The last seem even to have
been increasing during the years of transi-
tion.) Fazekas (1997) points to high trans-
port costs as an important constraint on
daily commuting, despite small distances
within the country. He pointed out that
assuming daily commuting by car and
considering the cost of driving and the
wage distribution, less than 50 per cent of
the jobs were likely to pay more than the
sum of the minimum wage and transport
cost for a commuting distance of 20 km.
He also emphasised that the problem con-
cerns especially the vulnerable groups that
should rely most on commuting, since
there are no jobs available for them in
their places of residence.
Obviously, such serious constraints
on labour mobility can only be eased in the
very long term, in decades rather than
years. The Hungarian government has
taken some steps in this direction (projects
aimed at improving the infrastructure and
road network, measures to establish mort-
gage financing, subsidies for house-
building, etc.), but they are at a rudimen-
tary stage and it will be a long time before
they make a real impact.
The persistently low labour mobility
at home seems to imply a constraint on the
number of potential migrants, especially to
Austria, since it is unlikely that many per-
sons will move into the Western, more de-
veloped parts of the country, from where
they could turn potentially into cross-
border commuters. On the other hand,
sluggish wage development could induce
extra migration.
One analysis of future wages to have
appeared (Ferenczi 2000) points to an un-
ambiguous catching-up process, based on
some stylized facts. This seems too optimis-
tic, as it envisages a coincidence of several
favourable developments (a continuous
high inflow of foreign capital, productivity
increases, rising capital intensity, and of
course, persistent economic growth). A
more recent estimate (see Gács et al. 2001)
looks more realistic in referring to experi-
ence in less developed current EU mem-
bers. There the catching-up process in
wages has been fitful, and although
growth of both GDP per capita and wage
indicators has been steady since accession,
their development corresponds to the elas-
ticities of the EU as a whole. The gap be-
tween Hungarian wages and the EU aver-
age is smaller if calculated at PPP, but as
mentioned before, this has little relevance
for cross-border commuters. The estimate
forecasts (on the assumption of EU acces-
sion in 2005 and expansive wage growth
afterwards) that Hungary could reduce its
current 70 per cent wage gap by only 15
percentage points by 2020. This could di-
minish migration pressure, but if just
wages are considered, only to a moderate
extent.
Even if migration pressure persists in
a source country, this in itself is not suffi-
cient to induce migration. Also decisive is
the absorption capacity of the labour mar-
ket in the prospective receiving country.
Current conditions in Austria seem quite
favourable,24 as labour demand has in-
creased absolutely, especially in the areas
where many Hungarians are employed:
Vienna and Lower and Upper Austria. Al-
though the number of vacancies was not
notably high in 1999 in Burgenland, its
share in the total for Austria is higher than
its share of employment (3.8 per cent as
opposed to 2.5 per cent). Looking at the
branch structure of vacancies, this is also
favourable, although that of agriculture is
only 3.3 per cent. The share of the service
sector is a massive 58.6 per cent. It is in-
teresting to see that labour demand by
educational attainment in Burgenland
                                                
24 For an account of labour demand, see Balogh and
Pósán 2001.
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more or less reflects the findings men-
tioned earlier about the composition of the
commuters. The highest number of vacan-
cies (566 in 1999) is for persons with a
vocational school qualification, which
highlights from the demand side the im-
portance of qualifications. The second
highest number of vacancies is for persons
with only the eight years of primary
school. (In the case of Burgenland, this
may reflect high demand in agriculture for
seasonal workers.)
* * * * *
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APPENDIX
DATA USED IN THE SIMULATION MODEL
Table 11
 Scenario A: Assumed percentage change in real GDP per capita during the catching-up process
Romania Bulgaria Poland Hungary Slovakia CzechRepublic Slovenia EU–15
2001 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 2.0
2002 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 2.0
2003 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 2.0
2004 2.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 4.0 2.0
2005 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.0
2006 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.0
2007 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.0
2008 3.0 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.0
2009 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.0
2010 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.0
2011 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.0
2012 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.0
2013 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.0
2014 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.0
2015 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.0
2016 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.0
2017 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.0
2018 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 2.0
Table 12
Scenario A: Assumed GDP per capita at PPP calculated from the growth rates in Table 1
Romania Bulgaria Poland Hungary Slovakia CzechRepublic Slovenia EU–15
2000 5623 5231 8952 11289 10427 12665 15674 22517
2001 5735 5388 9310 11741 10740 13045 16301 22967
2002 5850 5550 9682 12210 11062 13436 16953 23427
2003 5967 5716 10070 12699 11394 13839 17631 23895
2004 6087 5888 10473 13207 11736 14255 18336 24373
2005 6269 6064 10891 13735 12205 14825 19070 24861
2006 6457 6246 11327 14284 12693 15418 19833 25358
2007 6651 6433 11780 14856 13201 16034 20626 25865
2008 6850 6626 12251 15450 13729 16676 21451 26382
2009 7124 6892 12741 16068 14278 17343 22309 26910
2010 7409 7167 13251 16710 14849 18037 23201 27448
2011 7706 7454 13781 17379 15443 18758 24129 27997
2012 8014 7752 14332 18074 16061 19508 25095 28557
2013 8335 8062 14906 18797 16704 20289 26098 29128
2014 8668 8385 15502 19549 17372 21100 27142 29711
2015 9015 8720 16122 20331 18067 21944 28228 30305
2016 9375 9069 16767 21144 18789 22822 29357 30911
2017 9750 9432 17438 21990 19541 23735 30531 31529
2018 10140 9809 18135 22869 20322 24684 31753 32160
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Table 13
Assumed population growth rates under Scenarios A and B*
Romania Bulgaria Poland Hungary Slovakia CzechRepublic Slovenia EU–15
2000
2001 -0.20 -0.50 0.10 -0.40 0.20 -0.20 0.00 0.19
2002 -0.20 -0.50 0.10 -0.40 0.20 -0.20 0.00 0.19
2003 -0.20 -0.50 0.10 -0.40 0.20 -0.20 0.00 0.19
2004 -0.20 -0.50 0.10 -0.40 0.20 -0.20 0.00 0.19
2005 -0.20 -0.40 0.20 -0.35 0.10 -0.20 -0.30 0.15
2006 -0.20 -0.40 0.20 -0.35 0.10 -0.20 -0.30 0.15
2007 -0.20 -0.40 0.20 -0.35 0.10 -0.20 -0.30 0.15
2008 -0.20 -0.40 0.20 -0.35 0.10 -0.20 -0.30 0.15
2009 -0.20 -0.40 0.20 -0.30 0.10 -0.20 -0.30 0.15
2010 -0.20 -0.40 0.20 -0.30 0.10 -0.20 -0.30 0.15
2011 -0.20 -0.40 0.20 -0.30 0.10 -0.20 -0.30 0.15
2012 -0.20 -0.40 0.20 -0.30 0.10 -0.20 -0.30 0.15
2013 -0.20 -0.40 0.20 -0.30 0.10 -0.20 -0.30 0.15
2014 -0.20 -0.40 0.20 -0.30 0.10 -0.20 -0.30 0.15
2015 -0.20 -0.40 0.20 -0.30 0.10 -0.20 -0.30 0.15
2016 -0.20 -0.40 0.20 -0.30 0.10 -0.20 -0.30 0.15
2017 -0.20 -0.40 0.20 -0.30 0.10 -0.20 -0.30 0.15
2018 -0.20 -0.40 0.20 -0.30 0.10 -0.20 -0.30 0.15
 Note: Scenario B: The same (stagnant growth) in both regions.
Table 14
Assumed population without migration under Scenarios A and B* in millions
Romania Bulgaria Poland Hungary Slovakia CzechRepublic Slovenia EU–15
2000 22.4 8.2 38.6 10.0 5.4 10.3 2.0 385.5
2001 22.4 8.2 38.6 10.0 5.4 10.3 2.0 386.2
2002 22.3 8.1 38.7 9.9 5.4 10.3 2.0 387.0
2003 22.3 8.1 38.7 9.9 5.4 10.2 2.0 387.7
2004 22.2 8.0 38.8 9.8 5.4 10.2 2.0 388.4
2005 22.2 8.0 38.8 9.8 5.4 10.2 2.0 389.0
2006 22.1 8.0 38.9 9.8 5.5 10.2 2.0 389.6
2007 22.1 7.9 39.0 9.7 5.5 10.2 2.0 390.2
2008 22.0 7.9 39.1 9.7 5.5 10.1 2.0 390.8
2009 22.0 7.9 39.1 9.7 5.5 10.1 2.0 391.4
2010 22.0 7.8 39.2 9.6 5.5 10.1 2.0 391.9
2011 21.9 7.8 39.3 9.6 5.5 10.1 2.0 392.5
2012 21.9 7.8 39.4 9.6 5.5 10.1 2.0 393.1
2013 21.8 7.8 39.5 9.6 5.5 10.0 1.9 393.7
2014 21.8 7.7 39.5 9.5 5.5 10.0 1.9 394.3
2015 21.7 7.7 39.6 9.5 5.5 10.0 1.9 394.9
2016 21.7 7.7 39.7 9.5 5.5 10.0 1.9 395.5
2017 21.7 7.6 39.8 9.4 5.5 10.0 1.9 396.1
2018 21.6 7.6 39.9 9.4 5.5 9.9 1.9 396.7
  Note: Scenario B: The same (stagnant growth) in both regions.
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Table 15
Population in millions with migration
Romania Bulgaria Poland Hungary Slovakia. CzechRepublic Slovenia EU-15
2000
2001 22.4 8.2 38.6 10.0 5.4 10.3 2.0 385.500
2002 22.4 8.2 38.6 10.0 5.4 10.3 2.0 386.232
2003 22.3 8.1 38.7 9.9 5.4 10.3 2.0 386.966
2004 22.3 8.1 38.7 9.9 5.4 10.2 2.0 387.702
2005 22.2 8.0 38.8 9.8 5.4 10.2 2.0 388.438
2006 22.2 8.0 38.8 9.8 5.4 10.2 2.0 389.021
2007 22.1 8.0 38.7 9.7 5.4 10.1 2.0 389.868
2008 22.1 7.9 38.6 9.7 5.4 10.1 2.0 390.709
2009 22.0 7.9 38.6 9.6 5.4 10.0 2.0 391.546
2010 22.0 7.9 38.5 9.5 5.4 10.0 2.0 392.377
2011 21.8 7.8 38.4 9.5 5.4 9.9 1.9 393.378
2012 21.7 7.7 38.3 9.4 5.4 9.9 1.9 394.370
2013 21.5 7.6 38.2 9.4 5.3 9.9 1.9 395.355
2014 21.3 7.6 38.2 9.3 5.3 9.8 1.9 396.331
2015 21.2 7.5 38.1 9.3 5.3 9.8 1.9 397.299
2016 21.0 7.4 38.0 9.2 5.3 9.7 1.9 398.259
2017 20.8 7.4 38.0 9.2 5.3 9.7 1.9 399.211
2018 20.7 7.3 37.9 9.1 5.3 9.7 1.9 400.154
Table 16
Scenario B: Assumed percentage change in real GDP per capita
Romania Bulgaria Poland Hungary Slovakia CzechRepublic Slovenia EU–15
2001 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2002 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2003 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2004 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2005 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2006 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2007 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2008 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2009 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2010 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2011 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2012 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2013 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2014 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2015 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2016 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2017 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2018 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
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Table 17
Scenario B: assumed GDP per capita at PPP
Romania Bulgaria Poland Hungary Slovakia Czech Re-public Slovenia EU–15
2000 5623 5231 8952 11289 10427 12665 15674 22517
2001 5735 5336 9131 11515 10636 12918 15987 22967
2002 5850 5442 9314 11745 10848 13177 16307 23427
2003 5967 5551 9500 11980 11065 13440 16633 23895
2004 6087 5662 9690 12220 11287 13709 16966 24373
2005 6208 5775 9884 12464 11512 13983 17305 24861
2006 6332 5891 10081 12713 11742 14263 17651 25358
2007 6459 6009 10283 12968 11977 14548 18004 25865
2008 6588 6129 10489 13227 12217 14839 18365 26382
2009 6720 6252 10698 13491 12461 15136 18732 26910
2010 6854 6377 10912 13761 12710 15439 19107 27448
2011 6991 6504 11131 14036 12965 15747 19489 27997
2012 7131 6634 11353 14317 13224 16062 19878 28557
2013 7274 6767 11580 14604 13488 16384 20276 29128
2014 7419 6902 11812 14896 13758 16711 20682 29711
2015 7568 7040 12048 15194 14033 17045 21095 30305
2016 7719 7181 12289 15497 14314 17386 21517 30911
2017 7874 7325 12535 15807 14600 17734 21947 31529
2018 8031 7471 12786 16123 14892 18089 22386 32160
